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Abstract 
This paper explores the implications of financial reform for marginal clientele in 
developing countries. It first surveys increasingly more ambitious attempts at reform, as C1 
consequence of the failure of the old interventionist and protectionist strategies of 
development. It claims that the role of government has shifted from the control of financial 
prices and amounts to the preservation of macroeconomic stability and financial system 
solvency. Financial reform is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for increased access 
to financial services by marginal clientele. Actually, lack of access is due to a much lesser 
extent to market failure than to incomplete organization and limited institutional and 
physical infrastructure. Belief that the observed patterns of interest rates and limited access 
to formal credit in rural financial markets were due to market failure led, however, to the 
incorrect design and eventual failure of most small farmer credit programs. The main flaws 
were a generalized lack of concern for risk and for institutional viability. In addition to new 
policies and institutional design, however, financial innovations will be required. Local 
financial institutions may become sources of innovation, but cannot reduce systematic risk 
sufficiently. The development of financial market systems and networks will be needed in 
order to overcome the limitations of local intermediaries, both in a micro and a macroeco-
nomic sense. 
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I. intr(Jduction 
These are times of extraordinary transformations. Undoubtedly, the monumental 
changes that have been taking place in the world's political and economic arenas have been 
a major part of every German's daily life in recent years but, perhaps concerned with the 
consequences of these transformations on their immediate circurµstances, many may have 
not realized that these swift shifts are not merely a European phenomenon, but that rather 
the entire world is rapidly changing. 
The transformation has been as unpredictable as it has been swift. I do believe that 
not very many were able to predict the extent and speed of the modifications. In retrospect, 
of course, one can see that the recent events have been the outcome of processes that have 
been taking place over many years. Some may have recognized particular dimensions of 
these trends, but possibly only a few were able to see the whole picture. Even today, it is 
1 This paper resulted from a lecture by the author at the Deutscher Genossenschafts-und 
Raiffeisenverband E.V. in Bonn, Germany on March 25, 1992. 
2 The author is Professor of Agricultural Economics and of Economics at The Ohio 
State University. He is grateful for the invitation of Paul Armbruster to visit the German 
Cooperative Banks and for the comments of those who attended the lecture in Bonn. Most 
of the ideas reported here have resulted from the author's work in the Rural Financial 
Markets Program at Ohio State, sponsored by the Agency for International Development. 
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difficult to predict where all of these transformations will finally lead the world economy. 
Some general directions may be identified, nevertheless. 
I believe that, despite some strong, but hopefully short-term protectionist feelings in 
several places, the world market is becoming a more competitive place. This has been in 
part a consequence of technological revolutions, both in production methods and in 
communications, and sharp cost reductions in the transportation of goods and services across 
boundaries. As a result, comparative advantages are shifting and production and trade 
patterns are rapidly changing. Everywhere, financial systems are responding to these 
transformations at an increasing pace. 
Substantial changes are taking place in the newly industrializing and in the developing 
countries, as well. In part, these changes have been a response to the new challenges and 
opportunities in the world economy. Mostly, however, the transformation has been the 
inevitable outcome of the failure of strategies of economic development that were inherently 
not sustainable. As part of what in Latin America has been called "The Silent Revolution," 
many countries have been drastically revising their economic policy regimes. Leading 
developing countries (Chile, Mexico, Bolivia, Indonesia, Thailand, among others) have 
realized that future increases in the standards of living of their populations will necessarily 
be associated with a more competitive insertion in the world markets. After decades of 
inward-looking, protectionist, import-substitution strategies of industrialization and after 
decades of emphasis on the role of government intervention in the allocation of resources 
and in the promotion of economic growth, many developing countries are increasingly 
turning to market signals for a more efficient allocation of scarce resources. 
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The failure of protectionism and of excessive and misdirected government 
intervention in the developing countries has thus paralleled the failure of central planning 
in European socialist economies. In response, many developing countries have substantially 
reduced their trade barriers, eliminated their price controls, sold their state-owned 
enterprises, and diminished the size of their government bureaucracies. 
II. Financial Reform 
In the earlier decades after World War II, the financial systems of the developing 
nations were organized from the same dirigiste, interventionist perspective. They were 
heavily regulated, in order to control both the prices and the amounts of financial services 
supplied and to promote some sectors of economic activity at the expense of others. These 
financial policies were not sustainable and the financial systems so repressed failed in 
promoting growth, efficiency, or social equity. 
Financial repression actually induced a contraction of the real size of financial 
systems as well as processes of formal disintermediation, currency substitution, and capital 
flight. Savers were penalized with low (if not negative) real returns on deposits, while a few 
borrowers received highly concentrated subsidies and formal financial intermediaries lacked 
viability. Thus, on the their own initiative and/or at the recommendation of international 
agencies, in recent times many developing countries have attempted more or less ambitious 
financial reforms as part of their structural adjustment programs. 
Both the non-financial and financial policy reforms associated with structural 
adjustment programs have had a major impact on the operations and performance of 
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financial institutions in developing countries. In general, the aggregate macroeconomic 
environment in which these institutions operate has experienced deep modifications, while 
the nature of the rules and regulations that constrain their behavior has substantially 
changed. 
In particular, the role of government has shifted from the control of prices and 
quantities (in substitution of market forces) to the promotion of the stability of the monetary 
system and the protection of savers. Financial intermediaries have been granted freedom 
to set the terms and conditions of the contracts with their clients: interest rates have been 
liberalized, controls on credit allocation have been removed, and competition has been 
encouraged, while prudential supervision has become the foundation of the new approach 
centered on stability. As a result, the monetary authorities (central banks) are expected to 
keep inflation low and the superintendencies of banks are expected to keep the system 
solvent, while the allocation of the command over purchasing power is left to market forces. 
III. Access to Financial Services: Markets and Institutions 
If one of the major objectives of these financial reforms is to facilitate access for 
large segments of the population to a wide set of financial services, including not only loans 
but, very importantly, depositing and money transferring facilities, then an important and 
difficult question would be: what do all of these reforms mean for the provision of financial 
services to marginal clientele (small farmers, microentrepreneurs, risky undertakings in low 
income countries). At a preliminary level, the answer is that these reforms are a necessary, 
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but not a sufficient condition, for increasing access of marginal clientele to financial services. 
Let us explore why. 
In the 1950s and onwards, the question of access to credit by marginal clientele was 
answered from an interventionist and protectionist perspective. The main assumption was 
that the observed lack of access to credit and the high and variable rates of interest charged 
by moneylenders and other intermediaries in informal markets were a reflection of market 
failure. It was assumed that informal lenders possessed excessive monopoly power and that 
limited access to credit resulted from all kinds of market imperfections that needed 
correction. The government had to do something about it. The answer were the special 
credit programs and specialized development banks that have managed subsidized, directed, 
supervised credit portfolios. 
Market failure was not the only possible explanation for the patterns observed in 
informal, rural financial markets, however. An alternative explanation is incomplete 
organization. Under incomplete organization, the physical and institutional infrastructure 
needed for the smooth operation of markets does not exist: 
• property rights are not sufficiently well defined, 
• contracts cannot be easily enforced, and 
• information is not readily available or it is too costly to acquire and to transmit. 
Eastern Europe faces today similar problems. In addition, however, the developing 
countries suffered because of the absence of a physical infrastructure; there were no roads, 
no bridges, no telecommunications and, as a result, markets were highly segmented. Thus, 
prices, including interest rates, differed widely from one location to another. No arbitrage 
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brought about uniform prices. This was not due to the presence of market distortions and 
imperfections but rather to the absence of a well-developed physical and institutional 
infrastructure, as a result of which both transaction costs and risks were extremely high.3 
This is not merely a theoretical distinction. In those earlier decades, an incorrect diagnosis 
of the reasons for the observed patterns of informal finance in the developing countries led 
to an inappropriate design of the cure. 
IV. Traditional Small Farmer Credit Programs 
I am particularly familiar with the performance of the public agricultural develop-
ment banks and small farmer credit programs. These programs were created under the 
assumptions that: 
• all producers need loans all of the time, 
• small producers cannot save and do not need access to depositing facilities, and 
• credit, particularly if it is subsidized, is a powerful instrument (a panacea) that can 
correct all of the problems faced by farmers. 
As a consequence, these programs: 
• focused only on loans, rather than on financial intermediation, and totally ignored 
savings mobilization, 
• insisted on targeting credit to particular clientele and for specific purposes and on 
strictly supervising the use of loan funds, and 
3 One cannot but be extremely impressed by the quality of the German physical and 
institutional infrastructure. Given this as well as political stability and complete absence of 
inflation, it must be comparatively easy to be a banker in Germany. 
• 
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• were unwilling to charge market interest rates. 
Because the three basic assumptions that guided the design of these programs were 
wrong, they have been a failure. Over several decades, however, governments and 
international agencies poured thousands of millions of marks into small farmer credit 
programs all over the world. There is nothing easier than to give money away. If economic 
development could be brought about simply by giving money away, we would already be well 
in our way toward development. 
Development is, however, about: 
• creating institutions that promote and protect creative productive behavior, 
• building the physical and institutional infrastructure that increases productive 
capacity, and 
• accumulating human capital in order to accelerate per capita real income growth. 
Throwing money away cannot bring about development and it can only alleviate 
poverty in a temporary fashion. Moreover, many believe that, in the long-term, throwing 
money at them only worsen the fate of the poor. What matters is to increase the 
productivity of resources. The development of financial markets is part of this process. 
Unfortunately, the development of viable financial institutions was stunted and retarded by 
financial repression policies. 
The evidence about the sorry performance of the small farmer credit programs 
steadily accumulated. In the mid-1970s, the AID Spring Review of Small Farmer Credit 
provided evidence from over 100 countries that already suggested the failure of these 
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programs all over the world.4 Research at The Ohio State University and elsewhere has 
extensively documented the extent and the reasons for this generalized failure.5 
Despite the massive flows of funds disbursed, access to credit remained limited; by 
the mid-1970s only a small proportion of the farmers of the developing world had received 
loans from formal intermediaries. On the average, only 15 percent of the farmers in Asia 
and Latin America and 5 percent of the farmers in Africa had ever received institutional 
agricultural credit.6 Although there has been some progress since then, limited access 
continues to be the key issue in rural financial markets, both from an efficiency and an 
equity perspective. 
Continued, reliable, low-cost, permanent access to financial services, both loans and 
deposit facilities, is the goal. Moreover, contrary to expectations, small farmer credit 
portfolios showed much concentration. A few among the numbers of borrowers (typically 
10-20 percent) captured the largest portion (over 80 percent) of the funds disbursed and of 
the associated subsidies. Income distribution worsened.7 
Furthermore, despite the massive volumes of funds disbursed, there was little 
evidence that they had contributed (to the same extent) to the growth of output and of 
4 Agency for International Development, Spring Review of Small Farmer Credit, 20 
volumes, Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1973. 
5 Dale W Adams, Douglas H. Graham, and J.D. Von Pischke (eds.), Undermining Rural 
Development with Cheap Credit, Boulder: Westview Press, 1948. 
6 Gordon Donald, Credit for Small Farmers in Developing Countries, Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1976. 
7 Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, "Interest Rate Restrictions and Income Distribution," 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 59: 973-76. 
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productivity or that they had promoted technological change. In particular, attempts to 
target credit by beneficiary and by use of the loan funds increased transaction costs for both 
lenders and borrowers. 
Targeting reduced the quality of the financial services provided because: 
• disbursements became untimely and insufficient; 
• procedures became rigid and onerous; and 
• the non-interest portion became the most important component of the costs of the 
borrowed funds. 
In sum, subsidized credit turned out to be quite expensive, particularly for small 
borrowers. High transaction costs do have indeed more adverse and regressive consequenc-
es than high interest rates.8 Targeting resulted in high operating costs for the lenders, as 
well. The spread between deposit and loan rates of interest was not sufficient to cover the 
costs and risks of lending to these marginal clientele. Massive operation losses followed. 
At the same time, portfolio delinquency soared, and many institutions became decapitalized. 
V. Institutional Viability 
The main problem of rural financial institutions has been their lack of viability. A 
viable financial institution is self-sustaining and valued by its clientele. This requires an 
8 Imagine two borrowers who are charged 20 percent interest on their loans. One, who 
borrows 100 marks, pays 20 marks of annual interest. The other, who borrows 10,000 marks, 
pay 2,000 in interest. If transaction costs (e.g., the cost of trips to the bank's branch) of 40 
marks are added (assuming equivalent fixed costs), the cost of funds for the first borrower 
is 60 marks (equivalent to 60 percent of the loan amount) and for the second 2,060 marks 
(equivalent to 20.6 percent). The smaller the loan, the greater the incidence of transaction 
costs, reflecting their regressive impact on distribution. 
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agency that is able to cover its costs, that provides high quality services, that reaches an 
increasing number of customers, that is dynamic in providing new financial services and 
products, and that actively searches for ways of improving its efficiency, as reflected, by the 
level and the degree of dispersion of the transaction costs incurred by its depositors, its 
borrowers, and the intermediary itself. Viable institutions possess credibility and are able 
to mobilize deposits from the public, collect their loans, and retain good management and 
staff.9 
The lack of viability of many rural financial institutions has been reflected by the 
steady reduction of their relative importance within the financial sector of the developing 
countries, as most of them have not been able to increase and, in many instances, even to 
sustain the flow of their loanable funds, in real terms. On the contrary, frequently their 
lending capacity has sharply decreased over time, because they have not protected their 
portfolios from inflation; they have not vigorously collected their loans, in order to be able 
to grant new credit; they have not aggressively mobilized local resources, in order to be able 
to widen the range of their services; and because, in view of the poor quality of their 
services and the high transaction costs that they impose, they have lost the support of their 
clientele. 
As their institutional weaknesses have become increasingly evident, these special 
credit programs have lost the support of the international agencies that created them and, 
9 See Richard L. Meyer, "The Viability of Rural Financial Institutions and the System 
as a Whole," Report of the Fourth Technical Consultation on the Scheme of Agricultural Credit 
Development, Rome: FAO, 1988, pp. 41-44. 
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as a result, their loanable funds have further substantially declined. Ironically, their lack of 
viability has been, in large part, a consequence of their strong dependency on these outside 
funds. Given this strong financial dependency on political agencies as well as their limited 
mobilization of deposits from the public, there has been a significant political intrusion in 
the operations of the specialized rural lenders, in the sense that the decisions about who to 
lend to, what to lend for, and in what terms and conditions to lend have not been 
autonomously made by the financial intermediary, but have been imposed from the outside 
by the external sources of their funds. The criteria used have not necessarily been 
compatible with their financial viability. 
Lacking viability, their survival has been questioned by many, including their own 
clientele. Increasing levels of loan default have evidenced this loss of the support of their 
customers. Loan delinquency has been a signal that the borrowers have not been interested 
in the survival of the institution. Since they have not anticipated it to be able to provide a 
permanent service, the expected value of their relationship with the intermediary has been 
low, and they have not protected it with the timely service of their loan obligations. 
Furthermore, where they have not mobilized voluntary deposits from the local community, 
these rural financial institutions have lost the potential support from a mass of depositors. 
Where available, the quality of the services provided to the depositors has determined the 
extent of their support and, thereby, the institution's ability to grow on the basis of locally 
mobilized resources. 
In general, however, traditional agricultural credit programs were not concerned with 
institutional survival. Their management autonomy was seen as much less important than 
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the non-financial objectives to be pursued: either increased agricultural output or 
productivity, or the adoption of technological innovations, or integrated regional 
development, or agrarian reform. Resources for these purposes were apparently abundant, 
always replenishable from outside, by governments, central banks, and international donors. 
These specialized credit programs were designed with only the interests of targeted 
borrowers in mind; not the interests of depositors, or for the sake of the viability of the 
institutions. Subsidized loans were programmed for clientele chosen independently of their 
repayment capacity and institutional mechanisms for collection efforts were weak. I have 
witnessed many heads of state organize a party in order to disburse loans to poor farmers, 
always accompanied by scores of photographers. I have never seen them preside over loan 
recuperation. Institutional viability and, in the long term, survival, have been less important 
than patronage. 
Consistent with the protectionist strategies and interventionist policies of the time, 
these credit programs mistrusted the market and minimized the role of interest rates as a 
tool for resource allocation. Despite its good intentions, targeted and supervised credit has 
been fruitless in increasing output, given the fungibility of funds. Thus, interest rate 
controls, while reducing revenues, thus contributing to the intermediary's losses, have been 
ineffective. Moreover, when their rewards have been repressed, savers have avoided 
deposits in regulated financial institutions. They have voted with their feet (or rather with 
their funds) against these policies, since their ability to get organized as lobbies in order to 
seek privileges has been almost nonexistent. 
• 
• 
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Created with the best of intentions, in practice the small farmer credit programs 
found it difficult to target subsidized loans, to postpone concerns about creditworthiness, to 
postpone concerns about risk management, and still remain financially viable at the same 
time. Many programs eventually withered away. Many of programs evaluated by the Spring 
Review in the 1970s disappeared. The landscape of the developing nations is littered with 
too many failed or insolvent development financial institutions. 
VI. Problems of Credit for Marginal Clientele 
The failure of subsidized and targeted credit programs has been well documented. 
It reflected an incorrect interventionist policy perspective that relied on the control of prices 
and of quantities in financial transactions. It also reflected an inadequate institutional 
design that postponed concerns about institutional viability, as well as instances of 
government failure, principal-agent problems, and political intrusion. The problems 
encountered by these programs may have also reflected, in addition, the high costs and 
inherent difficulties of providing financial services to marginal clientele; that is, the 
consequences of the incomplete organizational framework that had been ignored by the 
interventionist approach of the time. 
To the extent to which the failure of the specialized credit programs reflected 
incorrect policies and regulations, a better policy regime was needed. To the extent to 
which failure reflected inadequate institutional design, new institutional models were 
required. These have been the roles of financial reform. Although good policies and 
14 
correct institutional design are necessary conditions for success, however, they may not be 
sufficient.10 
The provision of financial services is not an easy task. It is particularly costly when 
the clients are small, heterogeneous, and dispersed in not densely populated areas. In part, 
these difficulties are not unique to the provision of financial services: it is generally not easy 
to bring services (health, education) to remote, sparsely populated areas. In addition, 
however, finance is particularly difficult because of the intertemporal nature of the 
transactions involved. What is exchanged is purchasing power now, for a promise to repay 
in the future. The promise may or may not be fulfilled. Financial markets are about the 
management of this risk. The ability to successfully screen potential borrowers implies the 
choice of appropriate financial technologies. These technologies are intensive in the use of 
information and in mechanisms for the enforcement of contracts. 
Developments in financial theory during the past two decades, associated with 
principal-agent problems and asymmetric information, have been useful in explaining the 
complexity of these lender-borrower relationships.11 While the lender emphasizes loan 
safety (repayability), the borrower focuses on profitability and wealth accumulation. The 
goal of the lender is to effectively screen applicants and to induce a borrower's behavior that 
10 Partial financial reforms, particularly those that exclude marginal clientele as an 
exception, allowing a "preferential" treatment, lead to the worst of both worlds, since they 
further reduce the incentives (and capacity) to supply financial services to marginal clientele. 
They turn out to be counterproductive. 
11 See the September, 1990 issue of The World Bank Economic Review on a Symposium 
on Imperfect Information and Rural Credit Markets. 
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coincides with its goals. Inducing such behavior is costly. We do not have sufficiently cost-
effective technologies to provide financial services to most of these marginal clientele. 
Risk management through signalling, screening, monitoring, and collecting activities 
remains at the core of the financial intermediation problem. Perceptions about risk and 
tools for dealing with risk were not part, however, of the organizational culture of the 
specialized credit programs. Because of financial repression and inadequate incentives, 
technological innovation in finance was retarded. 
Recently there has been an increasing interest m the role of local financial 
institutions, such as credit unions, municipal banks, non-government development 
organizations (NGOs), and self-help groups in providing financial services for marginal 
clientele. Local institutions posses comparative advantages in (inside) information and in 
contract enforcement (social sanctions) that allow them to reduce the risk of default. They 
can also operate at low transaction costs for their clients and at low operational costs for 
the lender. This is the traditional advantage of the moneylender. They can break even with 
a small volume of operations. 
Local financial institutions are extremely vulnerable, on the other hand, to exogenous 
shocks, which causes excessive portfolio risk. They suffer from a severe lack of opportuni-
ties for portfolio diversification (e.g., a flood wipes out the entire clientele of the local 
lender). This explains the high interest rates and low transaction costs associated with 
moneylenders. Local financial institutions thus have strengths, but also important 
weaknesses. One must go beyond them. This implies a systems approach. 
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A microeconomic reason for the development of financial market networks and 
systems is therefore the need to protect the stability of individual financial intermediaries. 
There is also a macroeconomic reason, however. From the perspective of an increased 
productivity of resources, financial intermediation over a wider space leads to the integration 
of capital markets and to the increased efficiency of investment. This is the role of finance 
in economic development.12 
VII. Conclusion 
Many microenterprise and poverty-lending programs have been designed as relief 
programs rather than genuine credit activities. They are not true credit programs, because 
they have not been concerned with creditworthiness; they have not been especially devoted 
to recuperating loans and to pricing them correctly. There is nothing wrong with charity, 
of course. Social and economic development cannot be built, however, upon philanthropic 
efforts. Efficient, cost-effective financial intermediation is a critical input in any process of 
economic development. This requires appropriate policies and institutional viability. 
Much has been learned by now about the determinants of the success of credit 
programs for small producers. Among the major determinants of success is institutional 
viability. Moreover, beneficiary gains (increased employment and income) have been closely 
correlated with the viabi1ity of the financial intermediary. Such viability usually reflects a 
strong institutional and managerial desire for self-sufficiency and growth, a clear 
12 Ronald I. Mc.Kinnon, Money and Capital and Economic Development, Washington, 
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1973, and Edward S. Shaw, Financial Deepening in 
Economic Development, New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. 
'I 
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understanding of the value of money, a strong concern for the extent and nature of the risks 
involved, and sound financial policies. Successful financial intermediaries treat interest rates 
as prices. Financial management matters for them. They diversify their portfolio, mobilize 
savings and collect their loans. 
After ambitious financial reform efforts in many countries, the new environment 
looks promising. Within the new policy regime, financial institutions for marginal clientele 
will find greater opportunities for increased profitability and growth. They will no longer 
suffer the financial repression that characterized the old policy regime. They will be able 
to more freely mobilize deposits from the public and other local resources and thereby 
diversify their sources of funding. Excessive dependency on governments, central banks, and 
international donors constrained their growth and allowed a significant political intrusion 
that reduced their viability. The objectives and agendas of the donors resulted in 
conditionality criteria that not always protected the viability of these financial institutions. 
With their greater independence will come increased viability, but also increased 
accountability. 
Major changes in the economic environment in which these financial institutions 
operate are already having a significant impact on their performance and on their 
opportunities to survive. Some will accept the implicit challenges, will undertake the 
appropriate transformations, and will come out strengthened. Others will miss the 
opportunity to grow, quantitatively and qualitatively, and will eventually not survive. Still 
others, completely obsolete in the new environment, will have to disappear. Their resources 
will then be reallocated to other activities, where they will be more productive, and the 
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services that they have provided will be supplied by other agents, with a stronger 
comparative advantage in doing so. New institutional designs will emerge and, hopefully, 
the development nation's organizational framework will be strengthened by them. 
